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Foreign Investment under the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: 





While it aims to foster an economic relationship conducive to continued Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) based on shared values such as free markets, the United Kingdom (UK) – 
European Union (EU) Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) of 2020 contains limited 
formal protections for FDI, focusing on the prohibition of nationality-based discrimination with 
a view to minimizing significant disruptions, but with extensive exceptions to market access 
commitments contained in Annexes. The TCA does contain an innovative non-regression 
mechanism, designed to maintain a regulatory Level Playing Field (LFP) through which unfair 
distortions in competition resulting from radical policy departures are curtailed when a material 
impact on investment results. This article will review the investment provisions of the TCA 
including the new LPF rebalancing mechanism as well as the agreement’s state to state dispute 
settlement system. It will suggest that the TCA’s treatment of investment captures the 
theoretical model of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ in public policy through which associated 
changes are generally gradual but marked by sudden, severe upheavals – such as Brexit itself. 
The limited coverage for investment coupled with a narrow re-balancing mechanism for LPF 
departures therefore appears to be designed primarily to discourage sudden, major policy 
changes by the Parties regarding environmental and labour matters which have distinct impacts 
on FDI. In so doing the TCA seeks to mitigate the worse effects of economic dis-integration 
between the UK and the EU as their respective approach to foreign investment diverges over 
time. Whether it manages to achieve a state of policy equilibrium between the parties which is 
conducive to high FDI flows is uncertain and may depend on modifications made to the treaty 




According to the theory of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ borrowed from the biological sciences, 
changes in public policy are thought to take place gradually supplemented sudden, major shifts 
resulting from exogenous interferences.1 If the UK’s departure from the EU may be thought of 
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as such an abrupt re-alignment in the economic relations between the parties2, then the Trade 
and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), concluded in late 2020, may serve to moderate the ensuing 
policy changes associated with the unusual process of economic dis-integration in which the 
parties seek to establish a degree of stability as they drift apart. The agreement seeks to achieve 
this by asserting common goals in the promotion of trade and investment as well as social 
movements such as the environment and labour,3 but also, and more relevantly for the purposes 
of this paper, by helping to maintain market access for foreign investment and disincentivizing 
the most pronounced regulatory divergences as they affect foreign investment through a 
mechanism of tariff retaliation supervised by international adjudication.  
          The capacity to facilitate investment between the agreement’s parties is one of the 
objectives of the TCA, as set out in the preamble.4 With this goal in mind, it should be noted 
that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the UK from the EU amounted to £28 billion in 2019 
(79 per cent of all inward investment into the UK), the third consecutive year of decline. 
Moreover, there was a net dis-investment of UK FDI into the EU in 2019 of almost £20 billion, 
reversing a two-year period of net UK investment in the EU which peaked in 2017 (the year 
after the Brexit referendum).5 While FDI flows tend to fluctuate significantly from year to year 
due to a range of factors, there appears to be a trend of declining investment flows between the 
UK and the EU, suggesting that minimal barriers to entry coupled with legal protection for 
established foreign investors should remain a top priority for both parties.  
            Capturing the model of punctuated equilibrium in policy change noted above, the 
relationship between the UK and the EU in terms of the laws governing foreign investment 
appears to be characterized by rather sharp immediate disruption (in the form of the UK’s 
departure from the Single Market and therein loss of free movement of capital6) which one 
might expect will be followed by the relative stability of readjustment due to the modest 
                                                          
equilibrium in public policy has been defined by Givel as: ‘long‐term and relatively incremental policy change 
followed by an exogenous shock to a policy monopoly resulting in a tipping point oriented toward sharp and 
explosive policy change.’ Note the compatibility of biological (evolutionary) punctuated equilibrium as a 
descriptive model for public policy change has been challenged by commentators: M Givel, ‘The Evolution of 
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3 Preamble: ‘[B]elieving in the benefits of a predictable commercial environment that fosters trade and 
investment between them and prevents distortion of trade and unfair competitive advantages, in a manner 
conducive to sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental dimensions.’  
4 Ibid. 
5 M Ward, ‘Foreign Direct Investment Statistics’ House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, Number CBP-8534, 
23 December 2020  
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investment protections contained in the TCA. The TCA’s Level Playing Field (LPF) 
obligations and associated rebalancing mechanism, designed to eliminate unfair competition 
between the parties based on lowering of standards in areas such as labour and environmental 
protections,7 may help temper more precipitous changes by disincentivizing severe departures 
from social policy as they relate to investment (among other matters). The ensuing gradualism 
in economic disintegration between the UK and the EU in the sphere of investment may 
therefore be seen as a plausible end goal of the TCA – a kind of managed separation in which 
sharp and therefore economically distortive changes in the legal treatment of foreign 
investment are minimized. This is in keeping with the observation of punctuated equilibrium 
theory (as it applies to policy) that rule of law and robust institutions such as courts are key 
factors which resist periods of significant and in some cases disorienting transformation.8 For 
international legal academics, it is well-recognized that systems of adjudication based on rule 
of law, such as those in the TCA, play a vital role in “regime maintenance” by containing 
existing conflicts within defined legal parameters.9 
           This article will start (in Part II) by examining the investment liberalization provisions 
contained in the TCA. It will then turn to an assessment of the LPF obligations as they pertain 
to foreign investment (in Part III), followed by a closer look at dispute settlement under the 
agreement (in Part IV) and how it might serve foreign investors. Part V concludes by noting 
that the UK - EU’s relationship on foreign investment, as with other matters, is very much a 
work in progress but it can be expected that the TCA, in its current form, will function to 
mitigate some of the harsher divergences in the parties’ approach to policy which may unfold 
in the coming years. 
  
II. Foreign Investment in the TCA 
The TCA lacks a full investment protection chapter along the lines of modern Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) such as the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA). It contains no guarantee against expropriation without compensation nor does it 
contain obligations of Fair and Equitable Treatment or Full Protection and Security, familiar 
to practitioners and commentators in the field of international investment law. Moreover, there 
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is no Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the TCA, meaning that to the extent that the 
TCA creates rights for foreign investors, there is no system through which these may be directly 
enforced against the state parties. These substantive and procedural elements were most likely 
omitted from the tight schedule of negotiation of the TCA because they would have required 
ratification by individual EU Member States – international investment is a mixed competence 
under EU law.10 It may be that the parties will revisit investment protection in the future, 
perhaps including the EU’s Investment Court System, also found in CETA or UNCITRAL’s 
Multilateral Investment Court. Indeed, Article SERVIN.1.4:1 states that: ‘[w]ith a view to 
introducing possible improvements …, the Parties shall review their legal framework relating 
to trade in services and investment, including this Agreement.’ Other iterations of the TCA, 
possibly in the form of annexes or side notes, are quite likely to appear. 
In light of the omissions of conventional investment protections, UK investors have 
weaker protection in the EU under the TCA than Canadian ones have has under CETA, to cite 
but one example. This could end up making the UK a relatively unattractive place from which 
to base investments into Europe. Other treaties may offer some help in this regard. Pursuant to 
the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Slovak Republic v Achmea,11 
the Termination Agreement of 2020 ended all intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).12 
It did not, however, affect BITs between Member States and the UK. For EU investors in the 
UK, the UK has various BITs with EU Member States which are still in force e.g. Romania, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech, and Slovakia. Investment in the energy sector in the EU/UK 
is also still protected by the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Investors from these states in the 
UK in theory have access to a greater range of entitlements and remedies under these 
instruments before they are also terminated in favour of an EU-wide investment policy. 
While the TCA lacks the protections of a traditional international investment agreement 
(IIA) it does contain material designed to maintain market access for foreign investors in each 
party’s territory. Investment is covered in the Services and Investment Chapter (Title II) which 
opens with the encouraging statement that the parties ‘affirm their commitment to establish a 
                                                          
10 FDI falls within the ambit of the EU’s exclusive competences as part of its Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) of TFEU. The UK’s recent FTA with Japan, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA) (23 October 2020), also lacked investment protection provisions, although there are some 
investment liberalization commitments in it, e.g. National Treatment with respect to establishment and 
operation (Art 8.8) 
11 Case C‑284/16 (23 May 2016) 
12 Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European 
Union, OJ L 169, (5 May 2020) 
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favourable climate for the development of trade and investment between them.’13 No definition 
for ‘investment’ is supplied, itself unusual for a modern IIA many of which provide 
comprehensive definitions of this concept.14 The chapter does define  ‘investor of a Party’ as 
‘a natural or legal person of a Party that seeks to establish, is establishing or has established an 
enterprise … in the territory of the other Party,’15 a phrase which resembles that of most modern 
IIAs.16 Chapter 2 of the Services and Investment section is entitled ‘Investment Liberalisation’ 
which gives some indication that this section will not resemble that of a conventional BIT, 
which tend to focus on protecting existing investments rather than facilitating the entry of new 
ones – perhaps a reflection of the TCA’s goal of ensuring that FDI continues to flow between 
the parties in the context of economic disintegration. Accordingly, a Market Access provision 
is set out which prohibits quantifiable limits on foreign enterprises using language inspired by 
GATS’ material on market access.17 This section adds that parties may not restrict or require 
specific types of legal entity or joint venture through which an investor of the other Party may 
perform an economic activity.18 
Article 2.3 goes on to grant National Treatment to investors of the other party including 
in the pre-establishment phase (unusual for many IIAs, especially classic BITs) using the 
familiar ‘like situation’ comparator:  
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party and to covered enterprises treatment no less favourable 
than that it accords, in like situations, to its own investors and to their enterprises, with respect to their 
establishment and operation in its territory. 
 
Most Favoured Nation status, vital to protect foreign investment from regulatory competition 
as applied to investors from third stats, is extended in the next provision Article SERVIN 2.4.1: 
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party and to covered enterprises treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords, in like situations, to investors of a third country and to their enterprises, with respect to 
establishment in its territory. 
 
                                                          
13 TITLE II: SERVICES AND INVESTMENT Chapter 1: General provisions and Article SERVIN.1.1: Objective and 
scope 
14 E.g. CPTPP Art 9.1 (8 March 2018) 
15 Article SERVIN.1.2.j) 
16 E.g. CPTPP Art 9.1 
17 Article SERVIN 2.2 a) 
18 Article SERVIN 2.2 b) 
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2.4.2 adds the word ‘operation’ to establishment, helpfully covering all stages of a business’s 
lifespan. Subsection 4 clarifies that MFN treatment does not include ISDS provided in other 
international agreements, precluding investors bring importing it through a different instrument 
with a third party. The next section states that parties shall not require a covered enterprise to 
appoint individuals of any particular nationality as executives, managers or members of boards 
of directors,19 precluding another problematic barrier to continued FDI between the parties. 
The TCA rules out the requirement of a local presence as a condition for the supply of 
cross-border services,20 which should encourage parties to trade rather than invest where the 
latter is an unnecessary cost. The agreement further prohibits the use of performance 
requirements as a condition of establishment or operation of an investment, as is typically for 
modern IIAs as well as mandated by the WTO Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
Agreement. Beyond conventional performance requirements relating to the use of local 
content, this section expressly prohibits the requirement of technology transfer, including 
transfer of production process or other propriety knowledge.21 The next section prevents parties 
from conditioning investment incentives on various actions by investors of the other party, 
notably local content usage, however the capacity of parties to condition the receipt of 
incentives on employment or the expansion of facilities is maintained, as are incentives related 
to research and development.22 There is also a capital movements clause, allowing free 
movement of capital for the purposes of liberalisation of investment,23 which is similar to that 
found in many BITs, including conventional limits relating to bankruptcy and fraud.24 This 
clause assuages concerns that investors’ money may be tied up in foreign banks – not an 
inconceivable outcome given the instability of the banking system in some EU Member States. 
Finally, the TCA’s investment provisions are subject to a denial of benefits clause which 
enables parties to remove protections for investors in the furtherance of international peace and 
security, facilitating the imposition of economic sanctions.25  
 While the sections mentioned above ostensibly offer a high level of liberalization for 
foreign investors in each other’s territory, they need to be read in conjunction with the ‘non-
conforming measures’ scheduled by each party, including each EU Member State. This is 
                                                          
19 Article SERVIN.2.5 
20 Article SERVIN.3.3 
21 Article SERVIN 2.6 f) 
22 Article SERVIN 2.6.2 and 2.6.3 
23 Article CAP.3 
24 Article CAP.4 
25 Article SERVIN 1.3 
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contained in Annexes SERVIN 1 (existing measures) and SERVIN 2 (future measures). It is 
not possible to review these derogations from the commitments made in Chapter 2 here because 
these annexes are lengthy and complicated, covering many sectors and running to several 
hundred pages each. The crucial point is that there are many instances where there are local 
presence and nationality requirements – restricting full market access for foreign investment in 
the manner that it existed while the UK was a member of the Single Market. On the other hand, 
this format amounts to a ‘negative’ list style of market access in that the basic principle is one 
of openness with listed derogations, rather than the other way round as with GATS itself. 
It is important to recognize that the investment elements of the TCA, while limited 
relative to standard BITs, are rather advanced in relation to investment promotion. The TCA 
goes beyond the vague statements found in many IIAs by actively encouraging the promotion 
of FDI through the creation of contact points and enhanced information sharing regarding 
available opportunities.26 This sends a positive signal to investors from each party that new 
investment is sought. Such initiatives could become more important in the future, especially 
for SMEs, as regulations between the parties continues to diverge in areas relevant to foreign 
investors. Finally, the TCA’s general exceptions, modelled on those of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and covering maters such as the preservation of natural resources 
and safeguarding health, expressly apply to measures affecting both trade and investment,27 as 
is typical in most modern IIAs.28 
 
III. Level Playing Field (LPF) and Rebalancing for Foreign Investment 
The LPF obligations of the TCA essentially require that parties remain on an equal regulatory 
footing with a view to preventing unfair competition for foreign investment (and trade, 
although trade is beyond the scope of this article).  The essence of the LFP is contained in the 
statement in Article 1.1.4: 
The Parties affirm their common understanding that their economic relationship can only deliver benefits in a 
mutually satisfactory way if the commitments relating to a level playing field for open and fair competition stand 
the test of time, by preventing distortions of trade or investment, and by contributing to sustainable development. 
However, the Parties recognise that the purpose of this Title is not to harmonise the standards of the Parties. The 
Parties are determined to maintain and improve their respective high standards in the areas covered by this Title. 
                                                          
26 Article SME.3 
27 Title XII EXC.1 




This ethos is elaborated in Article 7.2 which states that parties shall not weaken or reduce their 
environmental protections, in a manner affecting investment between the parties from where 
the standards are at the end of the Brexit Transition Period (end 2020). This is the essence of 
the LPF - parties should not lower their standards in a manner that operates as an incentive to 
shift a firms’ location into its territory either from the other party or any third jurisdiction. Such 
‘non-regression’ clauses (also known as ‘standstill’ or ‘ratchet’ clauses) are common in modern 
IIAs as part of the movement towards the recognition of the role of host states in ensuring the 
observation by investors of corporate social responsibility principles, such as they relate to the 
environment as well as human rights.29 For example, CETA’s non-regression commitments in 
the policy areas of labour and the environment are as follows: 
 
The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the levels 
of protection afforded in their labour/environment law and standards. 
2. A Party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, its 
labour/environment law and standards, to encourage trade or the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention 
of an investment in its territory. 
3. A Party shall not, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, fail to effectively enforce its 
labour/environment law and standards to encourage trade or investment.30 
 
The phrase ‘sustained or recurring’ here indicates that single, isolated examples of regression 
are less important than ones that are regularly repeated. Some recent BITs use a standard of 
‘appropriateness’ to control this kind of behaviour: it is inappropriate for parties to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety environmental measures,31 and lowering labour 
standards.32 In the case of the TCA, the LPF obligation is bolstered by express commitments 
to honour such instruments as the International Labour Organization Declaration. Generally 
speaking, non-regression clauses in IIAs are thought to have had provided rather limited 
protection in the case of the environment, at least. Indeed, the EU does not rely on non-
                                                          
29 See e.g. M Footer, ‘Bits and Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation of Foreign 
Investment’ 18:1 Michigan State International Law Review 33 (2009) 
30 Art 23.4 (labour) and Art 24.5 (environment) 
31 E.g., Nigeria-Singapore BIT (2016); Bangladesh-Denmark BIT (2009), Bangladesh Turkey BIT (2012); Canada-
Jordan BIT (2009); Canada-Kuwait BIT (2011) 
32 USA-Rwanda BIT (2008); Japan-Mongolia EPA (2015); Austria-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2016) 
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regression clauses to maintain a LPF within the Single Market.33 More than 50 claims have 
been brought under the non-regression type clause in the ECT34 based on the removal of 
renewable energy subsidies,35 often in conjunction with breach of the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment standard.36 
The TCA’s LPF obligation is enforceable via a Panel of Experts for non-regression 
areas procedure.37 Non-compliance with a Panel of Experts finding can lead to arbitration under 
the TCA’s general dispute settlement system as well as the invocation by the complaining party 
of ‘temporary remedies.’38  These consist of the suspension of treaty obligations – essentially 
the imposition of tariffs on traded goods. Such suspension can become permanent if the 
objected-to change in law is not reversed. This novel ‘rebalancing’ mechanism through which 
the parties may retaliate in the form or removal of tariff preferences if the other lowers its 
standards in areas of labour, the environment or state aid, as they impact trade between the 
parties, is already controversial, attracting wide ranging commentary, see further below.  The 
system is unique because, since it governs continued relations among a former member of the 
EU’s Single Market, the TCA is an agreement designed to enable divergence rather than 
convergence yet at the same time it aims at facilitating FDI between the parties as well as 
commonality in regulatory goals in a manner which ‘stands the test of time’ (to use the TCA’s 
own wording) – capturing the notion of policy equilibrium noted earlier. 
The TCA envisions retaliatory tariffs as a secondary remedy (the primary remedy being 
the brining of the divergent measure into conformity, as under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding).39 Still, since the agreement preserves the Parties’ right to diverge on regulatory 
matters, subject to potential retaliatory tariffs, it preserves the Party’s regulatory sovereignty, 
permitting divergence while discouraging it. In addition to the availability of tariffs for 
                                                          
33 A Jordan, V Gravey, B Moore and C Reid, ‘EU-UK trade relations: why environmental policy regression will 
undermine the level playing field and what the UK can do to limit it’ Brexit and the Environment, Friends of the 
Earth (undated) at 8 
34 Article 19 of the ECT on environmental aspects is not framed as a non-regression clause, although it does 
speak of preventing distortions in investment by not upholding environmental standards – it does not mention 
‘no lowering’ or ‘no weakening’ of standards. 
35 For example: Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg s.a.r.l. & Antin Energia Termosolar v. Spain, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/13/31, Award, (15 June 2018); Antaris GMBH v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-01, Award (2 
May 2018); Novenergia v. Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, Award (15 Feb 2018); JSW Solar, PCA Case No. 2014-
03; Eiser v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Award (4 May 2017) 
36 A Mitchell and J Munro, ‘No Retreat: An Emerging Principle of Non-Regression from Environmental 
Protections in International Investment Law’ 50 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2019) 625 at 638 - ff 
37 Art 9.3 
38 Art INST.24 
39 Art 22 
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departures from the LPF, there is also the possibility for a limited reopening of the LPF 
commitments, providing essentially for a long-term rebalancing system aimed at 
accommodating permanent regulatory divergence, again seemingly with a view to avoiding the 
sudden shock of rapid divergence in favour of those which are established incrementally and 
discussed cooperatively. Overuse of the short-term rebalancing system can trigger a review of 
the LPF commitments entirely40 but the concept of over-use itself reflects an approach of 
gradualism to social policy as it affects investment. For example, if the UK pursued more far-
reaching environmental policies it may argue that EU business had an unfair advantage. Under 
such circumstances, it may seek to activate the ‘rebalancing’ mechanism in the short term and 
apply tariffs accordingly. In the longer term, the UK may wish to amend the TCA to take this 
divergence of approach into account. This goal is achieved by ensuring that any future 
negotiations are focussed on the LPF only as it applies to investment and trade, stimulating a 
limited tariff negotiation on goods in response to any derogation from the LPF provisions.41  
As they are phrased in the TCA, the rebalancing system overseen by the Panel of 
Experts is exceedingly narrow – seemingly aimed at addressing the most severe departures 
from shared policy goals which have distinct effects on foreign investment. In that sense it 
operates as a ‘shock absorber’ against punctuated equilibrium in policy direction. The threshold 
for ‘materiality’ to trigger the LPF rebalancing is undoubtedly to be a high one, affording 
limited scope for retaliation. In public international law ‘material breach’ of a treaty is one 
which violates ‘a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the 
treaty.’42 Indeed, it is a breach so serious that it allows the other party to terminate the treaty. 
The concept of ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty is itself often construed quite narrowly. 
Investment tribunals have been disposed towards using consequentialist arguments to reject 
interpretations of a treaty’s object and purpose which are too subjective and expansive.43 The 
phrase ‘material impact’ (which appears in the text of the TCA) differs from material breach 
calls for an interpretation based on the ordinary meaning of the words.44 This assessment must 
be rooted in international law, not EU or British law. Indeed, commentators have cautioned 
that the international nature of the TCA will require ‘a cultural shift for EU lawyers’ because 
                                                          
40 Art 9.4.7 
41 Art 9.4.5 
42 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 60(3)b (23 May 1969) 
43 E.g. Azinian v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 Award, (1 November 1999) at [87], reading down the 
purpose of NAFTA to prevent breach of ordinary commercial contracts from being seen as breaches of 
international law. 
44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 31(1) 
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it is not an instrument of EU law and it would be a category error to approach the interpretation 
of it as such.45 Again, the concept of ‘material’ is one which contemplates a high threshold, 
synonymous with that which is ‘important, significant, essential.’46 Moreover, the ‘strictly 
necessary’ standard for measures taken in response to such material deviations in the LPF 
offers even less scope for the complainant. Under public international law the standard of 
‘necessity’ is usually taken to mean that it is ‘the only means for the State to safeguard an 
essential interest against a grave an immanent peril.’47 In the field of trade, ‘necessity’ under 
GATT Article XX General Exceptions is similarly restrictive. It is understood to mean 
something close to indispensable; that there is no less trade restrictive way to achieve the 
desired goal.48 Investment jurisprudence suggests that this is a very tough test for host states to 
meet.49 
 The restrictive nature of the LPF rebalancing assessment is also revealed by an 
understanding of the meaning of ‘impact’ on investment. The Collins Dictionary definition of 
‘impact’ speaks of ‘a sudden, powerful effect,’ suggesting something quite significant as 
opposed to mundane, an outcome which is emphasized by the modifier ‘material.’ In this regard 
it is worth keeping in mind the principal of effectiveness in treaty interpretation, which 
essentially means that any provision is supposed to have some significance and to achieve some 
end – it cannot be interpreted in such a way that would render the word meaningless.50 
‘Material’ is not superfluous – it a way of confining impact to the most serious cases. The room 
for mandatory alignment between the two parties appears even narrower in this light. It might 
be useful to think of ‘impact’ as specified in the TCA as the opposite of a ‘benefit’ as found in 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.51 Analysis of ‘benefit’ by 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body has focused on market based assessments: did the 
recipient receive a financial contribution on terms more favourable than would otherwise be 
available to it in the relevant market?52 In the case of ‘impact’ surely it is the reverse of ‘benefit’ 
– the affected party suffered in a manner that it would not have done within the relevant market 
in the absence of the measure – in other words, a market distortion. This in turn raises 
                                                          
45 P Moser, ‘The TCA: New Law, Not EU Law’ EU Relations Blog (29 December 2020) 
46 Collins Dictionary Online [accessed January 2021] 
47 International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility 2001, art 25(1) 
48 Appellate Body Report, Korea Beef, WT/DS161/AB at [161] (adopted 10 January 2001) 
49 See e.g. C Galvez, ‘”Necessity”, Investor Rights, and State Sovereignty for NAFTA Investment Arbitration’ 46 
Cornell International Law Journal 143 (2013) 
50 Wintershall v Argentina, ICSID/ARB/04/14 Award (8 December 2008) at [165] 
51 Art 1(1)b 
52 Appellate Body Report Canada – Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB (adopted 4 August 2000) at [154] and [157] 
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complicated questions regarding the nature of the market in which the injured firm operates in 
the first place.53 Implicit allusions to market normality are seen in commentators’ use of the 
word ‘artificial’ to characterize acquisition of a comparative advantage over the other party 
through the derogation from existing standards.54 Changes in comparative advantage, 
suggesting long-term transformations in trade or investment flows, will not be easy to 
demonstrate. As noted earlier, FDI flows tend to fluctuate significantly from year to year in 
response to many different factors. It would accordingly be difficult to discern the signal of 
impacts from lower standards from the noise of movements from all other causes.  
The TCA further explains that an assessment of the impacts for breach of the LPF 
obligations must be based on ‘reliable evidence and not merely on conjecture or remote 
possibility.’ But in most cases, establishing a counter-factual – the situation that would have 
occurred had there not been material regulatory divergence on the LPF – would be hard without 
extensive guesswork.55 For example, in the case of a diversion in foreign investment, the 
complainant would need to show that an investor that would have located in its territory decided 
instead to establish in the other party’s territory because the regulatory environment in that 
jurisdiction was more attractive, not to mention lower in some measurable way. Alternatively, 
the complainant would need to show that the lower regulation in the other Party was the reason 
that an investor moved from its territory into the other Party’s territory. In either case, 
establishing an investor’s strategic motivation in this way would be a difficult evidentiary 
burden.56 Indeed, this is one of the reasons that investment incentives have never been formally 
controlled under international law.57  
 There is an additional requirement that rebalancing measures must be ‘proportionate’ – 
a concept that is familiar to international economic lawyers who note that proportionality tests 
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are evident in the decisions of international investment law tribunals.58 Assessing the quantum 
of compensation payable in international investment arbitration is a task of much complexity 
and controversy, regularly occupying much of investment arbitration tribunals’ time and 
typically incorporating the expert analysis of valuators. But in the case of LPF obligations, as 
articulated in the TCA, the task for the Panel of Experts would be near insurmountable. As 
Mitchell and Munro note: ‘The more intermediary steps between the regression [of the 
standard] and the encouragement, the more difficult it may be to demonstrate that the regression 
is the mechanism through which an “encouragement” is given effect, rendered even more 
problematic if subjective intent to encourage is required.’59 It is difficult enough for an 
investment arbitration tribunal to assess the economic harm suffered by a foreign investor as 
the consequence of an excessive regulation, perhaps reaching the standard of an indirect 
expropriation or breach of Fair and Equitable Treatment. Under the TCA’s rebalancing system, 
the question is not how much the investor has suffered, because of course the investor has not 
suffered since it has merely shifted from one jurisdiction to the other one (hence the 
unsuitability of ISDS as a forum for such claims). The appropriate question is rather how much 
as the host state suffered from the investor’s departure. But how would this harm be quantified? 
FDI flow declines, as suggested earlier? Or something else, perhaps reduced tax revenue? 
Unemployment data? A holistic measure incorporating tax revenue, employment, innovation 
and intangible social benefits might be more suitable.  
Even were it feasible for the claimant to establish such a figure, it would need to be 
expressed not in monetary damages (as in the case of conventional remedies in international 
investment law) but translated into preferential tariff concessions in favour of the other party 
which would thereby be removed. Again, this response would need to be proportional to the 
deleterious effect of the investor’s movement from one jurisdiction to the other, or even more 
problematically, its failure to establish in one party in the first place, instead choosing the other 
party in which case the harm would be entirely hypothetical (the counter-factual problem). A 
plausible guide to compensation in the latter case could be situations in which pre-
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establishment national treatment was breached.60 On the other hand, environmental claims, for 
example, tend to deal ‘behind the border’ measures such as those relating to water quality, 
environmental assessment, waste and land use planning. While such departures from the LPF 
may not have an impact on trade, they could be relevant to international investment, potentially 
affecting the location decision of a multinational enterprise.  
Most commentators appear to agree that the retaliation against departures from the LPF 
obligations will be difficult to challenge. For example, Lester asserts: ‘in practice it may not be 
all that easy to impose these [retaliation] measures, and if that’s the case, there won’t be much 
impact on a government’s regulatory decisions.’61 He goes on to compare the rebalancing 
mechanism to trade remedies under WTO law, through which claims for countervailing duties 
against subsidies are difficult to substantiate.62 Although not referencing the TCA’s LPF, 
Mitchell and Munro caution that it the assessment of what is meant by lowering of a standard 
in terms of an associated impact on the environment is a major problem: ‘[t]he difficulties and 
uncertainties in forecasting and measuring the effectiveness of environmental policies … as it 
develops over time create unanswered problems in applying non-regression clauses in 
practice.’63 They proceed to suggest that non-regression provisions may be most suitable as a 
means of bolstering claims brought under the basis of a violation of Fair and Equitable 
Treatment,64 which, as noted earlier, is missing from the TCA. 
To be sure, some hold that the TCA’s rebalancing tests would be easy to satisfy. For 
example, Chalmers believes: ‘The process is startling because of … the lax test for when they 
may be imposed …[it] requires there to be a “material impact” before these can be imposed 
but it is not clear what the word “material” adds. Any impact will have material effects.’65 The 
suggestion that divergences are presumptively impactful seems somewhat of an overstatement. 
If the qualifier ‘material’ did not refine the understanding of impact, surely it would not have 
been included at all.66 In a similar vein, Lavranos writes that the rebalancing mechanism ‘gives 
the parties significant room of manoeuvre to self-judge whether a certain situation justifies 
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unilateral corrective measures.’ He goes on to warn that the presence of the provisions in the 
TCA ‘could be an invitation to threaten to trigger these mechanisms, which in turn could 
provoke numerous small-scale trade wars.’67 The claim of ‘significant room to manoeuvre’ is 
hard to support given the clearly exceptional nature of the legal tests as discussed earlier. It is 
difficult to see how the test could have been framed more stringently without being omitted 
entirely. 
Divergence may have been the main objective of this feature of the TCA because of the 
understanding that regulatory divergence between jurisdictions can be efficient. Convergence 
for its own sake is not necessarily beneficial whereas an equilibrium of regulatory competition 
promotes good governance that is conducive to business and which enjoys public support. 
Lester notes that mandated convergence can ‘serve as an impediment to governments who want 
to revisit regulations that they believe are not serving their purpose or are excessively 
burdensome.’68 Likewise, Hewson argues: ‘In principle, [convergence] is undesirable, 
premised as it is on the idea that regulatory competition is to be discouraged; that somehow, 
one side or the other has alighted on the best way of legislating environmental or employment 
regulations and divergence is to be treated with suspicion.’69 With this understanding in mind, 
it is quite likely that the TCA was constructed precisely to facilitate divergences so long as they 
were not sudden and extreme. 
It has been suggested that the rebalancing mechanism in the TCA may not be used much 
because it would damage the reputation of the complainant party to do so. Applying tariffs 
against the other party for gaining ground in regulatory competition would effectively operate 
as an admission of sub-standard regulatory practice which pushed away business. Rotherham 
argues this applies particularly to the EU because it enjoys a reputation as a global standard-
setter. ‘The Commission may find it politically embarrassing at times to challenge regulatory 
diversion, because it would have to demonstrate the extent to which its own legislation carries 
considerable red tape costs.’ He proceeds optimistically to suggest that the LPF provisions 
could actually ‘encourage the EU side to reflect on regulatory burdens, and … to pursue proper 
cost-benefit analysis of proposed laws.’70  The need to demonstrate counterfactuals, for 
example that an investor would have stayed in the EU had it not been for the UK’s 
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abandonment of the LPF, may accordingly be thought of as a kind of losers’ attempt to recast 
itself as the genuine jurisdiction of choice for business which was thwarted by the illegitimacy 
of race-to-the-bottom enticements from the ‘other side.’71  
The political economy element of non-regression provisions in international economic 
agreements is alluded to by Krueger who notes that trade remedies disciplines (conceptually 
quite similar to the TCA’s LPF system) are necessary because ‘without a framework within 
which to evaluate charges of “unfairness” against foreigners, domestic pressures to raise tariffs 
would often be insurmountable.’ Thus, with a LPF / rebalancing type mechanism in place, 
‘there is at least some constraint’ on the pressure to engage in protectionism72 while preserving 
reputation. On the other hand, failure to use the rebalancing system to address perceived 
deficiencies in the regulation of foreign investment might equally be taken as a tacit admission 
that a party’s laws were inferior from the standpoint of achieving the social goals of the 
environment and labour while maintaining an environment conducive to commercial activity. 
The TCA’s LPF provides a mechanism that allows parties to diverge from existing rules where 
they are more of a burden than an advantage, provided that it does not result in drastic 
quantifiable harm to investment. It does so in a way that does not deter the parties from pursuing 
reforms since any retaliation by the other party is both uncertain and clearly limited.73 
 
 
IV. Dispute Settlement for Investment 
The absence of ISDS in the TCA should not be taken to indicate that there is a deficient system 
for the enforcement of investors’ rights, such as they exist in the agreement. The TCA’s state-
to-state mechanism may provide adequate, if indirect, enforcement for investors in as much as 
the home state can raise claims based on the various protections contained in the instrument. 
This is notwithstanding the fact that recent studies suggest that foreign investors value access 
to ISDS in contrast to other mechanisms, such as domestic courts or state-to-state systems.74 
State-to-state arbitration may be especially effective for claims based on pre-establishment 
national treatment. This is because it is designed to achieve declaratory relief in the form of 
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withdrawal of offending measures rather than monetary compensation – in other words, 
removing the unlawful barrier to entry.75 State-to-state dispute settlement is also thought to be 
the preferable forum for non-regression or LPF style claims,76 although in that case for the host 
state losing investment.  
While some commentators have lamented the lack of access to justice has thus been 
curtailed in that the TCA only provides for state-to-state dispute settlement,77 the inability of 
foreign investors to have a direct right of action against the parties is unlikely to arouse much 
criticism since investors, especially the larger multinationals, tend to be seen as having 
sufficient resources to use other systems, such as lobbying their governments to bring claims 
on their behalf. Moreover, the TCA provides that amicus curiae submissions ‘from natural 
persons of a Party, or legal persons established in a Party … that are independent from the 
governments of the Parties’ shall be ‘considered’ by the arbitration tribunal,78 hinting that 
investors may have a significant role in the resolution of disputes between the parties. It is 
noteworthy that State-to State dispute settlement, with no availability of ISDS, was also chosen 
by the parties in the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) of 30 
December 2020, suggesting that the omission of ISDS from the TCA may not entirely be due 
to a rushed negotiation schedule and the need for EU Member State ratification, since the CAI 
was the product of many years of negotiation. The EU and China did commit to pursue 
continued negotiations on investment dispute settlement going forward taking into account 
UNCITRAL’s work on a Multilateral Investment Court.79 This is also missing from the TCA, 
perhaps conspicuously so. 
Some further commentary is required on the nature of the dispute settlement for 
investment matters contemplated by the TCA, which, as with the other features mentioned 
earlier, seems to be designed to de-escalate tension with a view to maintaining long-term 
stability between the parties – in other words, avoiding ‘punctuated equilibrium’ where 
possible. The procedures for arbitration under the TCA are evidently yet to be fully determined.  
Much as seen under the WTO Dispute Settlement system and state-to-state arbitration found in 
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modern FTAs, the TCA’s dispute settlement process includes consultations followed by 
arbitration. The arbitration tribunal itself to be composed of three arbitrators,80 similar to ISDS 
and WTO procedures. Of these three arbitrators, one shall sit as chairperson. The composition 
of the arbitration panel is established by agreement between the parties within ten days after 
the request for the establishment of an arbitration tribunal.81  Sub-lists of arbitrators nominated 
by the EU, the UK, and chairpersons, who are not nationals of either Party shall be drawn up 
within 180 days of the TCA’s entry into force. There shall be at least five persons on each sub-
list at all times.82 Additional lists of individuals with expertise in specific sectors may be 
established with separate EU and UK nominated sub-lists.83 Individuals on the lists shall not 
be members, officials or other servants of the EU institutions, of the Government of a Member 
State, or of the Government of the UK.84 Arbitrators must be persons whose independence is 
beyond doubt, who possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office 
in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence.85 Furthermore, 
arbitrators shall have demonstrated expertise in law and international trade86 although expertise 
in international investment or investment treaties is not mentioned. Investment law specific 
expertise is perhaps less needed in this context than in ISDS, for example, given that 
investment-specific legal concepts such as Fair and Equitable Treatment and Full Protection 
and Security are absent from the TCA. Expertise in law and international trade may be 
derogated from “in view of the subject-matter of a particular dispute.”87 It will be interesting 
to see who the parties appoint to these rosters, especially given the highly politically charged 
nature of Brexit and the ensuing UK-EU relations, much of which has played out in publicly 
accessible commentary, potentially giving rise to accusations of bias. 
In keeping with ISDS and adjudication by the WTO panels and Appellate Body, 
deliberations of the arbitration tribunal are confidential, however the arbitration tribunal’s 
rulings and decisions shall be made publicly available by both Parties.88 The publication of the 
tribunal’s rulings shall also be subject to the protection of confidential information, meaning 
that sensitive information is to be redacted before the rulings are made public. Part X of 
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ANNEX INST: Rules of Procedure for Dispute Settlement lays out further rules pertaining to 
confidentiality: 
34. Each Party and the arbitration tribunal shall treat as confidential any information submitted by the 
other Party to the arbitration tribunal that the other Party has designated as confidential. When a Party submits to 
the arbitration tribunal a written submission which contains confidential information, it shall also provide, within 
15 days, a submission without the confidential information which shall be disclosed to the public. 
35. Nothing in these Rules of Procedure shall preclude a Party from disclosing statements of its own 
positions to the public to the extent that, when making reference to information submitted by the other Party, it 
does not disclose any information designated by the other Party as confidential. 
36. The arbitration tribunal shall hold the relevant parts of the session in private when the submission 
and arguments of a Party contain confidential information. The Parties shall maintain the confidentiality of the 
arbitration tribunal hearings when the hearings are held in closed session. 
 
This detailed emphasis on confidentiality herein may be contrasted with the drive towards 
greater transparency observed in international investment arbitration, captured most notably by 
the Mauritius Convention89 as well as the recent work by the UNCITRAL Working Group on 
ISDS reform.90 It would seem as though the arguments typically marshalled in favour of greater 
openness (enhancing legitimacy and accountability in public perception) are even stronger in 
the case of state-to-state arbitration especially under the politically charged TCA than in ISDS, 
the latter of which is by some respects closer to commercial arbitration where confidentiality 
is the norm. It is not difficult to imagine a public outcry against the outcomes of the TCA’s 
arbitration procedure on the basis of a lack of openness. This may be especially the case if there 
is a perception in the UK that the system has been co-opted by EU proceduralism and its 
attendant bureaucracy. Such apprehension has been identified, in another context, by Schnyder 
and Pfisterer who speak of a ‘subliminal fear’ of ‘individuals who act as trade law adjudicators 
and whether they should have the power to make decisions on issues that impact national public 
policy and sovereignty.’91 These problems are likely to be magnified by the fact that the TCA 
arbitration process does not appear to require the arbitral tribunal to disclose the reasons for its 
decision. This is in sharp contrast to generally accepted principles of international arbitration.92 
Reasoned decisions are necessary to ensure legitimacy in the sense of fairness and can assist 
with future conduct. Clifton notes that while disclosure of submissions to the public may be 
useful for the transparency of the proceedings, ensuring the appropriate point at which any 
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submissions are made public is crucial. If the submissions are made public before the 
arbitration tribunal has issued its decision, it could expose the arbitration tribunal to improper 
external pressure. This would seem to be especially risky in the case of the LPF obligations 
because they are already so politically fraught, at least within the UK where they are seen by 
some as a threat to sovereignty.93 As Lowe cautions, the ‘political climate, particularly in the 
UK, makes the TCA uniquely unstable.’94 Evidence supporting the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium in public policy suggests that the sharpness of transitions are often the consequence 
of the media’s engagement with and magnification of the process, which in turn shapes public 
opinion.95 Accordingly, the TCA’s confidentiality may contribute to gradualism in the 
divergence of the UK and EU’s economies.  
With regards to the rulings themselves, the arbitration tribunal must make every effort 
to draft rulings and take decisions by consensus, but if this is not possible, the arbitration 
tribunal will decide by majority vote. In no case shall separate opinions of arbitrators be 
disclosed.96 The lack of minority opinions is in contrast with the (recent) custom of the WTO 
and ISDS, where although dissenting opinions are rare, they are permitted. Dissenting opinions 
are thought to undermine the perceived legitimacy of an arbitral institution and by extension, 
participant country’s confidence in the system.97 Commentators have further noted that the rule 
against dissents is similar to that of the CJEU or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
Court, a feature which carries the disadvantage of undermining the potential clarity of the 
majority decision.98 On the other hand, the ability to issue a dissent judgment could serve to 
consolidate an individual arbitrators’ reputation on a particular matter which could play a role 
in their repeat appointments, potentially assisting in the creation of ‘jurisprudence’ which could 
in turn add to the predictability and thus stability of the system. 
Decisions and rulings of the arbitration tribunal shall be binding on the EU and on the 
UK alone. They do not create any rights or obligations with respect to natural or legal persons,99 
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meaning that investors themselves gain no direct enforceable legal entitlements. Since, as noted 
earlier, the TCA lacks provisions such as a guarantee against expropriation without 
compensation for which monetary compensation is suitable, this lack of access is perhaps less 
problematic. Evidently the primary purpose of the TCA is to address the regulatory capacity of 
the parties themselves helping achieve a kind of policy equilibrium which is conducive to 
competition, not to provide redress for injuries suffered by particular individuals. Investors’ 
rights under the party’s domestic legal systems are preserved. Article INST.29(3) and (4) TCA 
reads: 
3. Decisions and rulings of the arbitration tribunal cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations of the 
Parties under this Agreement or under any supplementing agreement. 
4. For greater certainty, the arbitration tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to determine the legality of a measure 
alleged to constitute a breach of this Agreement or of any supplementing agreement, under the domestic law of a 
Party. No finding made by the arbitration tribunal when ruling on a dispute between the Parties shall bind the 
domestic courts or tribunals of either Party as to the meaning to be given to the domestic law of that Party. 
 
From the above it is clear that the role of the arbitral tribunal is tightly circumscribed. Equally 
importantly, though, domestic courts have no role in the resolution of disputes between the 
parties under the TCA.100 This provision is key because it removes the interpretation of the 
TCA by adjudicators through any reference to EU law, either as it currently exists or as it is 
developed by the CJEU, one of the key reasons behind the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Even 
as it impacts the rights of investors, the TCA is pure public international law. 
It is not clear whether the arbitration tribunal will be ad hoc or more permanent in 
nature. The latter may be expected to provide greater stability in terms of ensuring that the 
regulatory dis-integration of the parties proceeds gradually through dialogue rather than as a 
sudden shock, potentially escalating to diplomatic crises. The formalization of the dispute 
settlement system may ultimately depend on the extent to which it is used. ANNEX INST: 
Rules of Procedure for Dispute Settlement paragraph 9a states: ‘Parties may appoint a registry 
to assist in the organisation and conduct of specific dispute settlement proceedings…the 
Partnership Council shall consider no later than 180 days after the entry into force of this 
Agreement whether there are any necessary amendments to these Rules.’ The rules of 
procedure for arbitration under the TCA may be amended as specified under Article INST.34A. 
Since the rules are rather under-developed, this may end up occurring soon.101 The TCA further 
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specifies that the Partnership Council may: b) adopt decisions to issue interpretations of the 
provisions of Part Two (covering trade and investment).102 States normally share the task of 
interpreting treaties with the tribunals constituted under them. For their part, tribunals must 
honour the common intention of the parties as reflected in the text of the treaty, sometimes 
construing the meaning of vague or incomplete terms, such as ‘material impact’ as discussed 
above. This process may benefit from constructive dialogue which promotes evolutionary and 
sustainable interpretations,103 again forestalling abrupt confrontations and potentially heading 
off withdrawal from the instrument altogether. Some commentators are surprised that states 
have so far been reluctant to seek joint interpretations of IIAs in cases where there is significant 
legal uncertainty harmful to both investors and states, both of whom prize legal stability and 
predictability. This is particularly so given that issuing a joint declaration is relatively easy for 
state parties.104 In international investment law, the interpretive functions shared by tribunals 
and committees/commissions have been distributed in the latter’s favour, fostering readings of 
investment treaties that are predictable and coherent. This reflects the incrementalism 
associated with courts and rule of law, countering the punctuation of sudden change, as per the 
theory of punctuated equilibrium in policy.105 Others contend that joint interpretations, such as 
envisioned by the TCA, have weakened the depoliticized nature of disputes that is so important 
in international investment law.106 As Chernykh observes: 
The inclusion of interpretive commissions/committees in the international investment law context 
therefore represents an attempt to limit the arbitrators’ interpretive monopoly by increasing the role of 
states....This represents a clear ideological shift: a political element has been introduced into the non-politicized 
dispute resolution mechanism.107 
 
The ideological shift mentioned here appears to fulfil the model of punctuated equilibrium in 
policy rather than mitigate it through the technical formalism of legal interpretation on a case- 
by-case basis.  
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If a more permanent arbitration system comes into being under the TCA or if even if 
there are repeat arbitrators, then a system of informal precedent is likely to emerge. While this 
could add to predictability, as many investors no doubt would seek, it raises the spectre of 
judicial activism and thereby exacerbate the democratic deficit associated with some dispute 
settlement systems in international law. As Pelc warns: ‘the notion that the meaning of 
[international] rules, and the precise balance of rights and obligations they represent might be 
… affected through litigation would seem politically unpalatable.’108 The politically fraught 
context of the UK’s departure from the EU is likely to worsen this perception were the 
arbitration system used frequently. On the other hand, it may be impossible to avoid some 
degree of precedentialism within a legalistic dispute settlement forum given that lawyers tend 
to favour consistency and certainty as an aspect of rule of law. Again, this may support an 
objective of gradual change, as the theory of punctuated equilibrium posits. 
 
V. Conclusion 
While there is an attempt to provide support for the liberalization of investment between the 
TCA’s parties, investment protections in the agreement are rather limited, both lacking in 
conventional BIT protections (both substantive and procedural) and heavily circumscribed by 
annexes. The TCA’s unique LPF obligations, which are aimed at preventing competitive 
distortions in investment, appear to be designed to address only the most severe regulatory 
divergences. Without ISDS, the TCA is enforceable through state-to-state arbitration, forcing 
investors to rely on their home states to defend their interests. If the TCA’s objective is to 
increase or even maintain current levels of FDI between the UK and the EU by providing a 
stable legal framework it is far from clear that it will do so. 
The investment protections contained in the TCA must be viewed in light of the febrile 
post-Brexit era and the process of regulatory disintegration over which the agreement purports 
to oversee – an uncommon situation in a world of FTAs designed to bring countries closer 
together. Commentators have expressed their concern that, freed from the EU, the UK intends 
to follow a path in which its standards in areas such as labour will be weakened as a way of 
                                                          
108 K Pelc, ‘The Welfare Implications of Precedent in International Law’ in J Jemielniak, L Neilsen and H Palmer 




gaining the upper hand,109 hence the LPF commitments which go beyond that seen in any other 
IIA.  
Whether such policy regression actually takes place, even incrementally, remains to be 
seen,110 but now appears to be unlikely given official statements from the UK assuring the 
opposite.111 It may transpire that the UK’s policy shift away from the EU will be one of form 
rather than substance, with the UK favouring a more flexible, pragmatic regulatory approach 
than the centralized and prescriptive nature of the EU.112 Moreover, there is no systemic 
evidence that weakening environmental or labour laws operates to attract quality FDI,113 
suggesting that the EU’s fears of a regulatory race to the bottom with the UK are a chimera. 
The fact that the EU signed an investment agreement with China subsequent to the TCA which 
contains no enforceable commitments on either labour or the environment illustrates that it is 
quite willing to countenance ‘weakening’ of these social norms for the sake of trade and 
investment when it needs to, as critics have already observed.114 It is evident that the LPF within 
the EU has always been about more about economics than the policy goals themselves, e.g. the 
environment or labour – i.e. preventing one member state from unfairly gaining a competitive 
trade advantage by weakening its standards relative to the rest, or through an unlimited use of 
state aid.115  
In the unique circumstance of two treaty partners who seek to moderate economic 
separation and who view one another as much as adversaries in competition for investment 
rather than wealth-generating allies, the TCA’s limited investment provisions seek to counter 
the punctuated equilibrium model of public policy – it is an agreement aimed at eschewing 
sudden breakages in favour of a gentle drift apart. Still, given the relative legal stability in both 
jurisdictions, the legal framework contained in the TCA should be viewed as conducive to 
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maintaining foreign investment flows between the parties which share, at a general level, 
common values on issues such as the environment, labour and the belief in free markets. Abrupt 
shocks resulting in sharp changes in public policy posited by punctuated equilibrium may yet 
unfold between the parties, as ongoing tension under the implementation of the Northern 
Ireland protocol demonstrates.116 The notion that the TCA, at least in its current form, will truly 
“stand the test of time” as an instrument supportive of foreign investment through such 
moments, remains uncertain. 
                                                          
116 ‘Making the Northern Ireland Protocol Work’ Financial Times, unauthored, (2 February 2021) 
